Re: virus: Re: Logic and Design ("parationality")

Eva-Lise Carlstrom (
Mon, 3 Nov 1997 10:26:03 -0800 (PST)

On Fri, 31 Oct 1997, David McFadzean wrote:

> At 10:10 AM 10/31/97 -0800, Eva-Lise Carlstrom wrote:
> >
> >On Fri, 31 Oct 1997, David McFadzean wrote:
> >
> >> It occurred to me recently that there may be no
> >> difference between my concept of "parationality"
> >> and "intelligence". Would that make sense?
> >
> >Not when you're instancing phototropism in plants in your explanation of
> >what you mean by parationality. You seem to be constantly trying to
> >collapse the ideas of "this is sensible behaviour" and "the creature that
> >is doing this is sensible". Acting in one's own best interests in
> >not the same thing as knowing that's what you're doing. Of course, the
> >latter does help greatly with the former, which is why intelligence is
> >such a useful adaptation.
> Is knowing what you are doing necessary for intelligence? What if
> intelligence is a spectrum with your favourite human genius at one
> end and a thermostat at the other? If you adopt this view of
> intelligence for the sake of argument does parationality make
> sense?
> BTW, spending a couple years trying to simulate the behaviour
> of an ant in software has given me utmost respect for insect
> intelligence.

Where I used the word "intelligence" above, the word "consciousness" would
probably have been more appropriate. Now that I understand that you are
talking about the sense of "intelligence" that does not require any
self-awareness, I agree that it seems to be the same thing as your