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The concept of ``intentionality''\label{intentionality} originated in
medieval philosophy, but
was revived by Franz Brentano (1838--1916).
It is rather different from what is usually meant by ``intention.''
Brentano suggested that it was the ``ineliminable mark of the mental.''
Our beliefs, for example, are necessarily {\em about\/} something, and
Brentano claimed that this is true for all mental phenomena, and no
physical phenomena;
``\ldots beliefs, desires, hopes, loves, wonderings, expectings, and so
on---are about something; they take an object.''\endnote{\cite[page
61]{OF:TSOTM}}
This object is the semantic content of mental states; the fact that
they refer to something is what gives our thoughts meaning.
The object need not actually exist---we might be thinking about a
unicorn, or Santa Claus---but without {\em some\/} object, there is no
thought, or anything of the sort.
In linguistic terminology, mental events are transitive.
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The citation is Owen Flanagan's book The Science of the Mind.
--
Robin