> I have a pretty standard objection to this interpretation of the
> Many-Worlds Hypothesis. See below.
> > What it all boils down to is that according to physical evidence,
> > reality
> > depends on the observer; we can only consciously inhabit one of these
> > parallel worlds at a time. This may have consequences for memetics,
> > particularly if we consider that observations effect experimental
> > results
> > and that consciousness plays a role in reality.
>
> Here's where I start having problems and the problems can be summed
> elegantly.
>
> Its wrong.
>
> The MWH is summed up admirably well to this point, but the conscious
> observer is given no privilidged frame under the hypothesis. In fact,
> the MWH suggests there are a near infinitely many of you at any given
> time, branched off from all the possible universi that had you as a
> member or as a possibility. There are even universi in which all the
> atoms in your body spontaneously translocated through quantum
> tunneling to Tokyo, last week, and returned you today. Oh, its a rare
> one, but they're all equally unique and rare.
This is vaguely related to *my* main objection to many-worlds [even
though it obviates the random-data limitations]:
Conservation of mass-energy is superficially violated, *grossly*.
It is a travesty of conventional Quantum Mechanics [indeed, all of
conventional physics] to suggest that an entire universe [highly
macroscopic mass-energy] can just appear as a quantum fluctation, *and
not be forced to disappear*.
That is:
The metaframework utterly violates mass-energy conservation.
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/ Towards the conversion of data into information....
/
/ Kenneth Boyd
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