The proof for sufficient reason seems to say: given x; x either exists or
doesn't exist; either way there has to be a reason for x existing or not
existing...it cannot be shown that x does not exist so therefore x exists.
In what state does x exist?
Seems we decided that x might exist in a monadic state; that is (in my
terms): Even though we cannot necessarily limit the conditions of x to
either x exists or x doesn't exist, we can show that all possible conditions
that might be proposed for x could still result in x being a monadic state
(and I assume that all possible conditions for x might include "either/or,
neither/nor, both/and, but/not"--notice I said *might* include, there have
been some proposed exceptions--still, as either/or was shown to be
inadequate, I assume that all other conditionals will have the same lack of
effect).
If x is a monad, then the effect of certain conditions can't effect this
state; nonetheless, the proof of this monad state contains certain
conditions. The proof, as shown above, might be written x <conditionals> x
(which says that the first x is a monad and the second x is the same monad
but that certain conditionals are proposed and negated so that "x the monad"
might be re-experienced as a transcendence of the conditional). One might
say that <conditionals>, in the sense of either/or, etc., are not sufficient
reason to show the existence or non-existence of a proposed x (though, the
conditionals are of a form which we can understand--as contrasted from the
monad state which might or might not exist outside of the conditionals but
which can only be proven as pertains to proposing the conditionals and
showing that they are not sufficient reason for accepting or negating the
proposal of x).
So, we have x the possible monad which we cannot see. We have some
conditionals which negate themselves. We have x the monad state which we
CAN see as it somehow transcends the conditions which one might place upon
it--as the conditions are proposed and found to negate themselves, we are
left with the idea that there MIGHT be an x which is a monad if only we
could provide sufficient reason for this x (which I state in the form: if
x->then x...which says that x the proposed monadic state is proposed ("if")
and then there is a process ("->") and then there is an x which is "proven"
and which cannot be the monadic state since it is shown only through
process...such that when this process is removed, the appearance of x remains.
This process (->) is a shorthand for the proof; that is, it is the proposal
of conditions which negate themselves. The idea that a proposed x can go
through this process which involves all possible conditions of this x and
can still remain implies that something about the proposing and negating of
conditions reveals an x which is independent of these proposed conditions.
Saying if x <conditionals> then x might imply that x is shorthand for all of
the possible conditions of x and so could just as easily be said
conditionals <x> conditionals. In this second case (conditionals <x>
conditionals), if following the above reasoning, the first instance of
"conditionals" might be a monadic state, and the second might be the same
monadic state *translated* through an x which is both stated and negated so
that in the second case these conditionals have the property of an ordered
process...one ordered along the same lines as <x>--thus "translated" from a
monadic state into one which follows THE rule implied by <x>.
Saying: If x, given certain conditions which average to chance, x survives
but in a mutated form...may be a formula for mutation in the sense that x
being an organism is subject to all forces of chance and will only survive
as a mutation. This is the genetic example I give for the formula x
<conditionals> x. Neither am I too certain how true this idea is, but it is
accepted as the method for evolution; that is if there is an organism, and
given chance recombination, there is survival of the fittest, and evolution
by mutation.
Saying: Chance conditions translated through this process become ordered
conditions...is the second example given (chance recombination <x> ordered
recombination), and is the memetic argument.
True, this changes what it is that "conditions" are understood to do, and
how one might correlate x in the first instance with x in the second
instance as being th same x but translated into some sort of order by the
conditions through which it is processed. That is, the argument shows that
correlation/chance is futile as it cannot provide for cause and effect, but
that correlation sets up the standards (or the process) by which a
non-ordered presentation of x could become an ordered presentation of x.
If genetics cannot show sufficient reason for cause and effect, then
memetics can show necessary reason for order.
Brett
Returning,
rBERTS%n
http://www.tctc.com/~unameit/makepage.htm
It is much easier to suggest solutions when you know nothing
about the problem.